Liu Qingbin
Three documents that are considered a long-term guideline for Japan’s diplomatic and security policies have finished all internal procedures at the co-ruling parties and will be submitted to the Diet on December 16 for approval and release.
The details revealed by Japanese media, such as increasing defense spending to 2% of GDP and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito reaching an agreement on writing the so-called “counterattack capability” into the guideline, indicated an about-face in Japan’s security policy. The three documents relate to Japan’s security in the next decade, and the defense budget program in particular concerns people’s livelihood.
Some media reported that in the upcoming National Security Strategy, China is the first topic – before Russia and DPRK – in the part about regional security safeguards. Japan doesn’t have a peace treaty with Russia and hasn’t established diplomatic ties with DPRK, but it has signed the “Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship” with China, the only one of all its post-war peace treaties that contains the keyword “friendship”. That was because bilateral friendship activities were widespread in Japan after the war, with Sino-Japan friendship associations established almost on every level of government.
But now, the LDP hawks, having worked on the public sentiments rather than economic growth in the past 20 years, have fermented Japan’s anti-China sentiments to a new high and wanted to retake the path of becoming a major military power by leveraging external forces. Describing China as a “threat” just exposes how they have picked up the legacy left by pre-WWII militarists.
When this was opposed by Komeito, the other party of the coalition, the American ambassador to Japan invited Komeito leaders to the US embassy to discuss the country’s security issue over tea, and the group photo taken at the tea party seems to be haunted by a “pressuring” cloud.
After the US ambassador to Japan tweeted the group photo, the countdown began on LDP and Komeito coming to a so-called consensus on abandoning the “defense only” policy that has been upheld for 70 years after WWII and developing the capability to attack enemy bases, according to media. It’s foreseeable that Japan will continue to strengthen its long-range strike capability, or even consider buying Tomahawk cruise missiles from the US.
But here comes the crux. Where does the money come from? Even if Japan’s military-industry-media complex gains the support of part of the people through hyping and exaggeration, that doesn’t mean they are willing to take money out of their pocket. To increase tax or issue bonds? That is the question for the Kishida administration and LDP. No cabinet can just increase tax or overissue treasury bonds at the snap of a finger, especially not Japan, whose consumption tax is already over 10% and national and local debts have amounted to more than 250% of GDP.
The LDP doves represented by Fumio Kishida are inclined toward tax increase. The government expert panel on strengthening defense capability submitted a report to Kishida at the end of November, saying that it is necessary to levy a broad spectrum of taxes on all Japanese in order to ensure a steady source of defense expenditure. The “pro-Abe” faction within LDP prefers issuing more treasury bonds, which easily reminds us of the “wartime treasury bonds” issued by Japanese militarists back in the years. It’s not all that long ago.
What Japan needs to think about now is how to address its domestic issues and contribute to regional and world peace and development. Being at America’s beck and call will only lead it astray. A China-Japan relationship of the new era is called for, and the ball is in Japan’s court now.
(The author is a visiting professor at Huaqiao University and former distinguished professor at Yokohama National University)
Editor's note: Originally published on huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.
