The situation in Myanmar has been mitigated since mid-April. Tthe Myanmar military has reiterated that it will hold an election after the end of the emergency state and hand over the state power to the elected political party.
自 4 月中下旬以来，缅甸国内局势总体有所缓和，但缅军再次长期直接执政显然不现实。实际上缅军也反复强调，将在紧急状态结束后举行新的选举并把权力移交给在选举中获胜的政党。
It’s foreseeable that the Myanmar military won’t hold the new election based on the current electoral system, so as to avoid another super party like the National League for Democracy (NLD) hard to control. In which way will Myanmar go then in its political development? There are not many options available. Some suggested that it may refer to the political path of its southeast Asian neighbor Indonesia and Thailand.
但可以预料的是，缅军一般不会再按照现行的选举制度举行大选，以免再度出现民盟这样难以掌控的超级政党。那么缅甸的政治发展模式将向什么方向发展呢，其实可供选择的样板并不多。有人提出，作为东南亚邻国的印尼和泰国的政治发展道路或可借鉴。
Military interference in state governance is a common phenomenon in the political development of southeastern Asian countries after WWII. Myanmar, Indonesia, and Thailand used to be controlled by the military for a long time. The difference is that while Indonesia and Thailand witnessed rapid economic and social progress during the military reign, Myanmar stagnated. When the new junta was established in September 1988, it reflected, place social and economic development high on the agenda in 1988-2010, and drew on Indonesia’s experience in its political transformation. But the Indonesian mode isn’t suitable for Myanmar at the moment, whereas the political system of Thailand may be more referable.
军人干政是二战后东南亚国家政治发展进程中的普遍现象，缅甸、印尼、泰国都曾出现过军人长期执政，其差别是印尼、泰国的社会经济在军人执政期间实现了快速增长，而缅甸陷入了长期的停滞。1988 年 9 月缅甸新军人政权上台后，也曾进行反思，在 1988～2010 年间把社会经济发展放到了重要位置，缅甸的政治转型在很大程度上就学习了印尼的经验。但从目前来看，印尼模式不太适合缅甸，泰国的政治管理体制可能更具参考价值。
The military regime led by General ThanShwe studied the political system in Indonesia in depth – how the military participated in state governance and set proxies and tried to follow suit. Theoretically, the Than Shwe government was very interested in the Indonesian theory about the military’s “dual role” and enshrined the military’s leading position in state governance in the 2008 Constitution.
丹瑞大将领导的军人政权曾长期研究印尼军人参政以及设置代理人的制度，并试图仿效。在理论上，丹瑞政府对印尼制定的军人 " 双重职能 " 学说十分感兴趣，在 2008 年宪法中规定了军人在国家政治中的主导地位。
In practice, Myanmar also drew on Indonesia’s tradition of reserving a fixed number of seats in the federal parliament. During Suharto’s term, the Indonesian military had 75 seats in the parliament, which was reduced to 38 after Habibie came in power. This system was abolished in 2004. The Indonesian military also formed the Golkar, a political party representing the military’s interests, to run for state power, which is similar to Myanmar’s Union Solidarity and Development Party.
在实践当中，为军人在联邦议会中保留固定议席，缅甸也借鉴了印尼的做法。在苏哈托主政时期，印尼军人在国家议会中有固定的 75 席，哈比比上台后减至 38 席，直到 2004 年才彻底废除。此外，印尼军人还建立了代表其利益的戈尔卡党来参选，缅甸的联邦巩固与发展党（简称巩发党）与其有几分相似。
As the Indonesian military has retreated from state power in the 21st century, and as the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) has lost two elections in 2015 and 2020, the Myanmar military is likely to reflect on the Indonesian model and draw lessons from Thailand.
由于印尼军人进入 21世纪后逐渐退出印尼政治，也随着巩发党在 2015 年、2020 年两次大选中惨败，缅军可能会对借鉴印尼模式进行反思，转而学习泰国的经验。
Bordering each other, Myanmar and Thailand differ greatly in economic achievements after WWII, but resemble each other in that their militaries both frequently interfere in state governance.
缅泰两国直接接壤，二战后两国的经济发展成就迥异，不过在军人频繁干政这点上，两国倒有几分相似。
In southeast Asia, Thailand witnessed the first and the most frequent military coups after WWII. The 1962 coup launched by Ne Win in Myanmar was to some extent influenced by Thailand, and many measures taken by the Ne Win regime were similar to those taken by Thailand’s contemporary SaritThanarat regime. After the Army Commander SuchindaKraprayoon resigned as prime minister in May 1992, Thailand entered a long period of scholarly governance, which created the illusion that the country had succeeded in its democratic transformation and the military would no longer meddle in state governance.
泰国是二战后东南亚国家中最早发生军人政变且政变次数最多的国家。缅甸奈温率领军人在 1962 年发动政变在一定程度上受到了泰国的影响，而且奈温当局的很多做法与同时期的泰国沙立政府也有相似之处。1992 年 5 月陆军司令素金达辞去总理职务后，泰国进入了较长时间的文官治国阶段，以至于很多人认为泰国的民主政治转型已经成功，军人将不会再干政。
It was, therefore, surprising when Thailand’s Army Commander SonthiBoonyaratglinwaged another coup 15 years later and overthrew the Thaksin government in September 2006. Sonthi’s visit to Myanmar on September 11-13, right before the coup, was suspected of being a “study tour”.
但出人意料的是，2006 年 9 月泰国陆军司令颂提率军推翻了他信政府，出现了泰国 15 年来的又一次军人政变，而且颂提在政变前的 9 月 11～13 日访问了缅甸，有向当时的缅军 " 取经 " 之嫌。
The situation faced by the Thai military then is very much like the situation in Myanmar in early 2021. At that time, the Thaksin-led Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party, leveraged on its popularity with the lower-middle class, won several elections. Still, Thaksin’s policies seriously eroded the interests of the Thai royal family, the middle class, and the military.
当时泰国军队面临的形势与 2021 年初的缅甸很相似，他信领导的泰爱泰党利用其在中下层群众中的影响力，在大选中多次获胜，但他信的政策严重危害到了泰国王室、中产阶级和军队的利益。
After the successful coup, the Thai military formed a transition government with former army chief SurayutChulanont as prime minister, and the constitutional court under military mandate ruled the TRT as violating the national constitution and forced its dissolution. Later the People’s Power Party deriving from TRT won the election in December 2007, but was suspected of cheating and forced to dissolve by the constitutional court. Then the Puea Thai Party was formed based on the remaining force of the People’s Power Party, which, leveraging Thaksin’s influence and his sister Yingluck’s favorable image, won the election in July 2011. However, the country fell into the abyss of a protracted confrontation between the People’s Alliance for Democracy(PAD) and the National United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) afterward.
政变成功后，泰国军方成立了由前三军总司令蒙拉育任总理的过渡政府，并通过其控制的宪法法院裁定泰爱泰党违宪并勒令其解散。之后脱胎于泰爱泰党的人民力量党在 2007 年 12 月大选中获胜，但被泰国宪法法院裁定涉嫌选举舞弊而将其解散。在 2011 年 7 月的大选中，由人民力量党剩余力量组建的为泰党利用他信的威望及其妹妹英拉的形象，再次赢得大选，但之后泰国陷入了旷日持久的黄衫军与红衫军的对峙。
In May 2014, Army Commander Prayuth Chan-ocha, after unsuccessful coordination, announced a coup, abolished the 2007 Constitution, and formed the National Council for Peace and Order comprised of the chief of various services to run the state. To legitimize their rule, the council also put together a provisional constitution and rushed it into force without having a referendum.
2014 年 5 月，在协调不成功之后，陆军司令巴育宣布政变，废除 2007 年宪法，成立由各军种最高首长组成的 " 全国维持和平秩序委员会 "，在全国范围内施政。为使军人掌权合法化，该委员会还制定了一部临时宪法，未举行全民公投就宣布生效。
To prevent the appearance of uncontrollable super parties like the TRT, the People’s Power Party (PPP), and the Puea Thai Party (PTP), the Thai military, on the one hand, deployed power and legal means to keep down Thaksin and his followers. On the other hand, it set up the National Reform Council under its control to revise the constitution and the electoral system. In April 2017, the new constitution representing the interests of the royal family, the military, and aristocracy came into effect, according to which only candidates approved by the military-controlled senate could be elected as prime minister.
另外，为了不再出现泰爱泰党、人民力量党、为泰党这样不受控制的超级政党，泰国军方一方面运用强权和法律手段，把他信及其亲信彻底打趴下，另一方面成立了由其掌控的改革委员会，对泰国宪法以及选举制度进行修订。2017 年 4 月，反映王室、军方以及贵族势力利益的新宪法生效，根据新宪法，只有得到由军人控制的上议院同意的候选人才有可能当选总理。
In March 2019, Thailand held the first election in eight years according to the new constitution. The pro-Prayuth Citizens’ Power Party didn’t win majority seats at the House of Commons, but it successfully got other parties with many seats to support Prayuth. This, coupled with the Prayuth-controlled senate, sent Prayuth to the position of prime minister again in June 2019.
2019 年 3 月，泰国根据新宪法举行了八年来的首次大选，支持巴育的公民力量党虽然在下议院未获得多数议席，但该党通过拢络几个得票相对较多的政党支持巴育，再加上巴育掌控的上议院，最终使得巴育在 2019 年 6 月再次成功当选总理。
By reforming the political system, the Thai military has wiped out the possibility for Thaksin to make a comeback and turned former military leaders into elected state leaders. This may shed light on those in Naypyidaw now.
泰国军方通过对政治制度的改革成功避免了他信势力的东山再起，并使脱下军装的前军队领袖成为民选领导人，这或许会对缅甸现在的执政当局有一定的启发。
(The author Li Chenyang is a researcher at the Center for China’s Neighbor Diplomacy and the Institute of Myanmar Studies, Yunnan University, and a senior research fellow at The Charhar Institute.)
作者：李晨阳，察哈尔学会高级研究员，云南大学周边外交研究中心、缅甸研究院研究员
Disclaimer: This article is originally published on this year’s 10th issue of World Affairs,a semi-monthly magazine on international politics, economics and culture. It is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information, ideas or opinions appearing in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.
