赵学林 王颖
By Zhao Xuelinand Wang Ying
日前召开的国际原子能机构理事会会议，第四次以协商一致方式决定设置单独正式议题，专门讨论“美英澳核潜艇合作所涉核材料转让及其保障监督等影响《不扩散核武器条约》（NPT）各方面的问题”。广大成员国在会上对三国核潜艇合作的相关问题表达了严重关切。
The recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors Meeting decided through consultation for the fourth time to set a separate, formal topic on the “transfer of nuclear materials in the context of AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation and its safeguards in all aspects under the Treaty on the Non－Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)”. IAEA members expressed their serious concerns over relevant issues regarding trilateral cooperation.
美英澳核潜艇合作开启了核武器国家向无核武器国家非法转让大量武器级核材料的危险先例，严重违背NPT目的和宗旨，直接构成核扩散行为，这是三国核潜艇合作的“原罪”。无论三国对此冠以何种名义，承诺采用何种方式处理这些武器级核材料，都无法掩盖武器级核材料将从核武器国家转移到无核武器国家这一基本事实。然而，美英澳三国不仅抛出“核材料封存在反应堆中，无法直接用于核武器”等辩词强词夺理，还拒不向国际原子能机构报告核潜艇合作实质进展。
The nuclear submarine cooperation among US, UK and Australia created a dangerous precedent of nuclear weapon countries illegally transferring huge amounts of weapon-grade nuclear materials to non-nuclear weapon countries, which is a serious violation of NPT’s purposes and goals and is a form of direct nuclear proliferation. That’s the “original sin” of the trilateral deal. No matter how the three countries try to disguise it and whatever approaches they promise to deal with the weapon-grade nuclear materials, they cannot cover up the fact that the materials will be transferred from nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states. Yet the three countries are still arguing on the grounds that “any nuclear material transferred would be in the form of naval reactor fuel and provided in complete, welded power units” and will not be directly used for nuclear weapons. They also refused to report to the IAEA the substantial progress on their nuclear submarine cooperation.
不仅如此，美英澳三国还企图搞政治操弄，胁迫国际原子能机构秘书处提出“洗白”甚至豁免三国核潜艇合作的保障监督方案，然后凭借自己在理事会的票数优势，强行推动理事会通过，从而使其非法扩散行径“合法化”。国际原子能机构总干事日前首次就美英澳核潜艇合作问题向理事会提交的书面报告，就无视国际社会对三国核潜艇合作存在核扩散风险的重大关切，片面引述美英澳为自身行为辩解的言论，甚至越权就本该由国际原子能机构成员国讨论决定的事项得出了误导性的结论，严重损害了国际原子能机构的防扩散职能与国际权威。
What’s more, the US, the UK and Australia tried, through political manipulation, to force IAEA Secretariat to propose a safeguards scheme to whitewash or even exempt the trilateral cooperation. Then, with their majority seats in the IAEA Board of Governors, they tried to ram through the scheme to legalize their behavior of nuclear proliferation. Lately, the Director General of the IAEA submitted the first written report to the Board of Governors on the announcement of the Australia, United Kingdom and United States (AUKUS) nuclear deal. The report, in disregard of the international community’s grave concerns over the nuclear proliferation risks of the trilateral deal, cited only the UK, the UK and Australia’s self-defending arguments, and jumped to misleading conclusions on matters that should have been discussed and decided by all IAEA members. That has seriously undermined the IAEA’s duty of preventing proliferation and its international authority.
国际原子能机构是政府间国际组织，其《规约》明确规定了机构目标，即“确保在其监管下提供的援助不致用于推进任何军事目的”，同时明确任何涉及保障监督的实质性问题须由机构成员国按程序协商研究做出决定，总干事也须“接受理事会领导，受理事会管辖”。
IAEA is an intergovernmental international organization. Its Statute expressly stipulates that “it shall ensure that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose”. It also states that any substantive matters concerning the safeguards must be decided through consultation and studies by the members according to procedures and that the Director General is subject to the leadership and instructions of the Board of Directors.
经过四次理事会会议讨论，国际原子能机构成员国更为深刻地认识到三国核潜艇合作的严重负面影响、特别是其防扩散风险和隐患，印尼、巴西等国家还在NPT第十次审议大会上散发工作文件表达各自关切。肩负着防止核材料被转用与核武器扩散重要使命的国际原子能机构，根本没有理由为三国核扩散的“合法性”背书，否则只会严重削弱自身的防扩散职能和国际权威。
After four rounds of discussions at the Board of Directors, IAEA members have more deeply realized the negative impacts of the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation, especially the risk and hazard of nuclear proliferation. Countries like Indonesia and Brazil handed out documents at the 10th review meeting of NPT to express their concerns. The IAEA, tasked with the important mission of preventing the transfer of nuclear materials and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, has no reason to endorse the three countries. Doing that will only hurt its discharge of the duty of preventing proliferation and eroding its international authority.
美英澳核潜艇合作事关NPT的完整性、有效性和权威性，相关保障监督问题涉及国际原子能机构所有成员国的利益，必须由成员国通过政府间进程探讨并寻求解决方案。因此，包括国际原子能机构在内的国际社会应继续敦促美英澳三国立即停止因其核潜艇合作导致的相关核扩散行径，该机构全体成员国也应继续在机构理事会和大会推进已四次协商一致达成的政府间讨论进程，聚焦三国核潜艇合作的本质和真相，以实际行动维护国际核不扩散体系，维护国际和平与安全。
The nuclear submarine cooperation among the US, the UK and Australia relates to the integrity, validity and authority of NPT, and the related safeguards concern the interests of all IAEA members. This is a matter that must be discussed by all members through intergovernmental arrangements in search of a solution. The international community, including the IAEA, should keep urging the three countries to immediately stop the nuclear proliferation actions caused by their cooperation, and all members should continue to push at the Board of Directors and the General Conference the intergovernmental discussions that have been agreed through four rounds of consultations. They must focus on the nature and truth of the trilateral cooperation and take concrete actions to preserve the international nuclear non-proliferation system and safeguard global peace and security.
（作者单位：中核战略规划研究总院）
(The authors are from CNNC Strategic Planning Research Institute)
