Why Australia corners itself to the forefront of confrontation?

澳何必把自己逼到对抗前沿?

Source
China Military Online
Editor
Wang Xinjuan
Time
2021-07-07 16:06:09

胡波

By Hu Bo

进入7月份,在澳大利亚附近海域有两场大规模演习举行。一场是7月5日至10日,有美日澳韩四国参加的“太平洋先锋队2021”演习;另一场是7月14日至31日,有美国、英国、日本、澳大利亚、加拿大、韩国和新西兰七国参加的“2021护身军刀”演习。

There are two massive exercises in waters near Australia in July. One is the Pacific Vanguard 2021 maritime exercise from July 5 to 10 involving the US, Japan, Australia and ROK, and the other is the Exercise Talisman Sabre 2021 lasting from July 14 to 31, participated by the seven countries of the US, the UK, Japan, Australia, Canada, ROK and New Zealand.

虽然这些演习都是例行的,但在内容设置上针对中国的一面无疑在上升。尤其是作为两场演习的“东道主”,澳大利亚最近在涉台议题上的表态非常出格。甚至,澳大利亚总理莫里森不久前首度放言,“一旦台海爆发战争,澳大利亚将履行支援美国及印太地区盟友的承诺。”澳方为什么不断鼓噪战争,接连采取挑衅举动呢?

These are routine exercises, but their contents have obviously become more targeted at China. Australia in particular, the host country of both exercises, has been making aggressive remarks on Taiwan-related topics recently, and its Prime Minister Scott Morrison even announced shortly before that once war broke out in the Taiwan Strait, Canberra would fulfill its commitment to assisting the US and its Indo-Pacific allies. Why does Australia keep making war provocations?

一方面,在中美战略竞争加剧的情况下,澳大利亚自我限缩选择空间。美澳同盟是澳大利亚军事安全战略的基石,两国有相近的价值观、长期“并肩战斗”的经历以及战略利益方面的相互需要。因此,追随美国成了澳大利亚的长期战略选择。

On the one hand, Australia has squeezed its space of choice amid the aggravating strategic competition between China and the US. The US-Australia alliance is the cornerstone of Australia’s military security strategy, and the two countries share similar values, long experience of “fighting shoulder to shoulder”, and mutual demand for strategic interests. Therefore, following Washington’s lead is Canberra’s strategic choice in the long term.

此外,作为美国在“印太战略”版图的“南锚”,澳大利亚企图扮演“副警长”角色,通过不断加强与美国的盟友关系图谋扩大其影响力。因此,二战后特别是冷战结束以来,澳大利亚在几乎所有的国际热点问题上都不分黑白曲直地站在美国一边,有时甚至主动代美国“出头”。

Besides, as the “southern anchor” of America’s “Indo-Pacific Strategy”, Australia attempts to play the role of a “deputy chief ” and expand its influence by reinforcing its alliance with the US. That’s why after World War II, especially after the end of the Cold War, Canberra has been standing firmly by Washington on almost all international hotspot issues regardless of rights andor wrongs and even stepping up for it proactively.

因此,一旦东亚有事,澳大利亚大概率将成为美军事行动的支撑点。澳前总理马尔科姆•弗雷泽称,“澳大利亚被牢牢困在美国体系内,一旦美国与中国开战,澳方除参战外别无选择”。更何况在和平时期,选择的成本并不高,澳在国内国际势力的推动下,不会拒绝冲在前沿。

Therefore, once anything happens in East Asia, Australia will most probably become the pivot of America’s military operations. Australia’s former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser once said Australia was locked in the American system; once war broke out between the US and China, Australia would have no choice but join it. Moreover, the cost of its choice is not high in peacetime, so Canberra wouldn’t refuse to dash to the front line, pushed both by domestic and international pressure.

另一方面,是因为澳大利亚对中国崛起的极度不适应。澳大利亚对中国的安全战略意图缺乏必要的认识,听信美国的那一套比较多,认为中国的崛起意味着“亚太安全风险的上升”。

On the other hand, Australia feels extremely uncomfortable with a rising China. Without the necessary and full knowledge about China’s security strategy and intention, it chooses to believe America’s slanders and rhetoric that China’s rise means a growing security risk in the Asia-Pacific.

同时,澳大利亚自视为美国同盟体系和西方世界中的重要一员,在维护“基于规则的国际秩序”方面负有责任。而且,不少澳政客渲染“中国今天不扩张不谋求霸权,不代表以后不那样做”。这种猜忌的深层次原因在于,澳大利亚对于中国体制充满戒心和不认可,以及长期居于西方集团的傲慢。

Meanwhile, Australia considers itself an important member of the American alliance system and the western world that bears responsibilities for maintaining the “rules-based international order ”. Many Australian politicians made the ridiculous claim that China may not seek expansion or hegemony today, but that doesn’t mean it won’t do that in the future. The deep-seated reason for such suspicion is Canberra’s wariness and disapproval of the Chinese system and its ingrained arrogance as a member of the West.

上述两大结构性因素制约了中澳双方在军事安全领域的互动,而在中澳关系总体龃龉不断的情况下,指望澳短期内改弦更张并不现实。澳方的选择当然有美国因素,但更多是基于其政治精英的战略认知。如果澳方不首先在战略和心态方面做出适当调整,即便中国出于睦邻友好原则采取一些积极的举动,也难以实质改变目前的状态。

These two structural factors limit the interactions between China and Australia in military and security areas, and it’s unlikely for Canberra to change course any time soon given the constant discords and collisions between the two countries. Australia’s choice may be influenced by the US, but it’s more strongly influenced by the strategic perception of political elites in Canberra. If Australia doesn’t adjust its strategy and mindset first, China’s positive actions for the sake of neighborly friendliness won’t substantially change the current status of bilateral relations.

实际上,在和平时期澳方有更多的选择。澳大利亚作为中美竞争中的第三方,可以适当扮演“缓冲器”或沟通桥梁的角色,在塑造中美关系中发挥作用。如果主动倒向美方一边,甚至在中美竞争中推波助澜,只会将自己逼到中美斗争甚至是对抗的前线。

In fact, Australia has many choices in peacetime. As a third party to the China-US competition, it can serve as a buffer or a bridge of communication and play a constructive role in shaping China-US relations. But if it is determined to side with the US, even adding fuel to the flames of competition between the world’s two largest economies, it will find itself cornered on the forefront of China-US conflict, even confrontation.

(作者是“南海战略态势感知计划”主任)

 (The author is director of the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative )

Editor's note: This article is originally published on huanqiu.com.cn, and is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information, ideas or opinions appearing in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.

 

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