An outlook of US-ROK alliance when thorny issues lie ahead

Source
China Military Online
Editor
Li Wei
Time
2021-02-26 17:59:06

By Ma Jing

According to a report from the public broadcaster KBS (Korean Broadcasting System) on February 24, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the US may hold a joint military exercise in mid-March, and the US Department of Defense (DOD) declared its stance on the same day and emphasized the importance of the joint ROK-US military exercise.

In addition, Chung Eui-yong, the new South Korean foreign minister who once served as the ROK Ambassador to the United States, is known as an “old hand to the US” in the diplomatic circle at home. Therefore, the outsiders have cared more about the development of the ROK-US relations and how to reach “appropriate balance” by the ROK in its relationship to China and the US in the future.

Earlier this month, the US and ROK defense ministers reiterated the “unbreakable alliance” between the US and ROK through a phone call. To restore the US-ROK alliance was taken as one of the important issues of the new US administration in foreign affairs in the Asia-Pacific region. It is true that the new Biden administration’s policies on the Korean Peninsula issue and the US-ROK alliance are bound to be different from previous ones; however, many problems facing the US-ROK alliance cannot be readily solved, which are tricky to deal with both for the Biden administration and the Moon Jae-in administration.

When it comes to the affairs of the US-ROK alliance, the defense cost-sharing between the ROK and the US and the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) are critical to the bilateral relationship. The age-old friction between the two sides in defense burden-sharing negotiations has come to a standstill since February last year, as the Trump administration proposed the rising share of defense costs to the ROK side and even made the overcharge as condition of the transfer of wartime OPCON. Compared with the Trump administration, the new Biden administration may adopt a more pragmatic approach to this issue.

The transfer of wartime OPCON has been a diplomatic issue to which President Moon Jae-in had attached great importance since he took office. He had vowed for an early takeover of wartime OPCON during his presidency. However, US officials have repeatedly delayed the transfer on the grounds of “some conditions unmet” over the past two years. Therefore, whether the transfer of wartime OPCON can be realized during Moon Jae-in’s tenure can be achieved is still in question, as restrained by the following three obstacles.

Firstly, it is restrained by the opposition by conservative forces of the ROK. The ROK society has been divided into two camps: the conservatives supporting the US-ROK alliance and the liberals advocating national independence. From the perspective of the conservative camp, the transfer of wartime OPCON means the breakdown of the “joint command” system that the US-ROK alliance has been always proud of, unfavorable to the coordination and synergy in commanding both the US and ROK forces in the event of future conflicts on the Korean Peninsula.

Secondly, affected by the COVID-19 epidemic, the verification of the command capabilities of the ROK forces by the US side has not been carried out as scheduled. The scale of the bilateral joint exercises and related subjects involved have dropped compared with previous years, which in turn will hinder the process of the transfer.

Thirdly, the announcement of defense budget cuts in 2020 by the ROK has brought much uncertainty. The conditions required for the ROK military to regain its wartime OPCON include the possession of core military strength and the ability to respond to nuclear weapon threats from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), both of which depend onthe strong support by the ROK’s defense budget. Under the impact of multiple factors, including the 2020 defense budget cut and the COVID-19 epidemic, the uncertainty of the defense budget on the ROK side has increased significantly in the future.

In addition, DPRK nuclear issue and the ROK’s attitude towards China are also the thorny issues facing the US-ROK alliance. As we all know, the DPRK nuclear issue can function as not only a binding agent but also the most serious source of friction to the US-ROK alliance. In the past four years, Moon and Trump administrations have maintained certain consilience with regard to their policies toward the Korean Peninsula, the situation of which has been relatively allayed. Nevertheless, unlike its predecessor, the incumbent Biden administration has not shown any interest in holding the US-ROK summit; instead, it has tended to resume the policy of “strategic patience” towards the DPRK pursued under Obama. This is running counter to the Moon administration’s policy towards the DPRK, and new contradictions thereby may arise in terms of the US-ROK relationship.

As for the policy toward China, new frictions may be triggered in the US-ROK relationship. In the early stage, the Biden administration may continue the Trump administration’s policy on China in some respects. The Biden administration, which tends to unite with alliances and regional partners to contain China, will take it for granted that the ROK, as an ally, is supposed to take the US’ side in US-China relations. As a result, the US exerts even more pressure on the ROK in operations like the so-called “Clean Network” plan and even puts forward more intense requirements for the “US-ROK-Japan military cooperation” to contain China.

The ROK side has euphemistically declined the “invitation” of the Trump administration out of multiple considerations such as economic interests and resolving the Korean nuclear issue. However, if the Biden administration keeps up strengthening the value-oriented diplomacy among its Asia-Pacific allies, the approach that ROK takes to respond to the new changes in US-China relations will be a test to the ROK.

(The author is an associate researcher at the International Development and Cooperation Research Center of Northeast Asia, Dalian University of Technology.)

 

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