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(October 2, 1950)
(1) We
have decided to send part of our troops, in the name
of volunteers, to Korea to fight against the armed
forces of the United States and its lackey Syngman
Rhee and to aid the Korean comrades. We deem this
essential. If all of Korea were occupied by the Americans
and the Korean revolutionary forces suffered a fundamental
defeat, the U.S. aggressors would grow more rampant,
which would run counter to the interests of the whole
of the East.
(2)
We deem that since we decide to dispatch Chinese troops
to fight against the Americans in Korea, then first,
this must be capable of resolving the problem, i.e.,
be prepared to wipe out and drive away the aggressor
troops of the U.S. and other countries in Korea, and
second, as Chinese troops (though sent in the name
of volunteers) will fight American troops in Korea,
we should be prepared for the U.S. declaring a state
of war with China and at least using its air force
to bomb a number of big cities and industrial bases
in China and its navy to attack our coastal regions.
(3)
The first of the two above questions is whether the
Chinese troops will be able to annihilate the U.S. troops
in Korea, thus effectively solve the Korean issue. If
only our troops can wipe out the U.S. troops in Korea,
mainly their Eighth Army (a veteran army with combat
capability), then though the second question (the U.S.
declaring war on China) may still remain a grave one,
the situation will become favorable to the revolutionary
front and China. In other words, with the Korean issue
concluded in fact with victory over the U.S. armed forces
(in form the issue may not yet be concluded with the
United States for a considerably long time refusing
to acknowledge Korean victory), even if the United States
has declared war against China, that war probably will
not be very large in scale, nor a prolonged one. In
our view, the most disadvantageous scenario would be
Chinese troops failing to annihilate large numbers of
the U.S. troops in Korea, resulting in a stalemate of
troop confrontation, while the United States would have
entered a state of war against China openly, thus frustrating
China's plan of economic reconstruction, which has already
begun, and causing dissatisfaction among the Chinese
national bourgeoisie and some other people (who are
very afraid of war).
(4)
In the present circumstances we have decided to move
from October 15 12 divisions (five or six are not sufficient),
which have previously been mustered in southern Manchuria,
and into appropriate areas in northern Korea (not necessarily
up to the 38th Parallel). On the one hand, these troops
will fight enemy troops that dare to attack areas north
of the 38th Parallel, initially only fighting defensive
battles, annihilating small contingents of enemy troops
and sizing up all aspects of the situation. On the other
hand, we are awaiting the arrival of Soviet weaponry
for reequipment of our troops with a view to going over
to the counteroffensive in cooperation with the Korean
comrades and wiping out the U.S. aggressor troops.
(5)
According to our knowledge, each U.S. army (composed
of two infantry divisions and one mechanized division)
is equipped with 1500 pieces of artillery of various
types, including tank guns and AA guns, with calibers
ranging from 7 cm to 24 cm. Our army (composed of three
divisions) has only 36 such heavy guns. The enemy has
control of the air, while the first batch of the Chinese
Air Force now undergoing training will be able to go
into operation with some 300 combat aircraft only in
February 1951. Therefore, at the present moment our
troops do not have the certainty of annihilating a whole
U.S. army in one campaign. However, since the decision
has already been taken to fight the Americans, we should
be prepared, when the U.S. high command concentrates
a whole army to fight a campaign against us on the battlefield,
to counter the enemy with a military strength four times
as strong (i.e., countering one enemy army with four
of our armies) and with firepower one-and-a-half to
two times as strong (i.e., countering the 1500 pieces
of enemy artillery of over 7-cm caliber with 2200 to
3000 pieces of our artillery of similar caliber), and
should have the certainty of annihilating one enemy
army thoroughly and completely.
(6)
In addition to the above-mentioned 12 divisions, we
are moving 24 divisions from areas south of the Yangtze
River and from the Shaanxi-Gansu area along the Longhai,
Tianjin-Pukou and Beining railway lines as the second
and third batches of forces for aiding Korea, to be
put into operation one by one next spring and summer
in view of evolving situation.
(From
the original manuscript)
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